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With each death of a US soldier in Iraq and each report 
about the absence of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction, it becomes more obvious that the attack of 
Iraq has backfired on the US administration. But the 
signs of backfire have been apparent for a long time. 
Before the invasion there were massive protest rallies, 
with the largest single-day numbers in history on 15 
February, including large numbers of people who had 
never joined a rally before. Public opinion in most 
countries was strongly against the attack. Many 
governments opposed it, most prominently several key 
members of the UN Security Council. Interviews in 20 
countries in May 2003 revealed that "in most 
countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower 
than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift 
between Americans and Western Europeans, further 
inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the 
war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global 
public support for the pillars of the post-World War II 
era - the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance."[1] 
Attacks of all sorts can backfire, especially when they 
are perceived as unjust. But as well as being a potential 
outcome of an attack, backfire can be studied as a 
process. Attackers often seek to prevent backfire, 
whereas opponents of the attack seek to magnify it. 
Backfire is an ongoing struggle, a sort of game. The key 
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is to understand the rules of the game. 
A note on terminology: I avoid calling the attack on 
Iraq a "war" because the conflict was so one-sided. In 
western media reports, the attackers were 
conventionally called "the coalition." Here I usually 
refer to the "US government" because it was the prime 
mover, with the British government playing second 
fiddle; the Australian and Polish military contingents 
were token and mostly unremarked. I avoid referring 
to "the US" as an actor - as in "the US said" or "the US 
attacked" - because it doesn’t distinguish between the 
government and the people. But even to refer to the US 
government as the attacker is misleading, because it 
was a relatively small group within the government 
that made the key decisions. 
I begin by outlining the basic process of backfire using 
historical examples. Then I examine the Iraq case, 
looking at five principal ways in which the attackers 
tried to inhibit backfire. 
  
Backfire: the process 
On 21 March 1960, white South African police in the 
township of Sharpeville opened fire on a large crowd of 
black Africans protesting against pass laws, killing 
perhaps a hundred and wounding many more. This 
massacre reverberated around the world, triggering an 
enormous upsurge in global anti-apartheid action.[2] 
The massacre can be said to have backfired in that it 
discredited apartheid and led to an expansion of 
opposition. 
Two factors are central to this backfire effect. The first 
is that the attack is seen to be unjust or, more 
generally, a violation of a widely held norm. In 
Sharpeville just prior to the massacre, there were 
clashes between police and black activists, including 
one in which several activists were killed. There were 
deep-seated misperceptions. Organisers of the rally did 
not plan an attack on the police, but many police 
believed they were under serious threat. Leadership on 
both sides was weak. Some protesters threw stones. 
Despite the lack of nonviolent discipline, though, 
nothing that the protesters did warranted sustained 
shooting without warning, with many crowd members 
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shot in the back. The shooting was grossly 
disproportionate to anything done by the protesters 
and this was seen as unjust. 
Across many cultures and historical periods, there 
appears to be a common sense of injustice.[3] The 
widespread reaction to the Sharpeville massacre is 
readily explained as due to a perception of injustice. 
However, not everyone perceives things the same way, 
no matter how blatant the situation may appear to 
some. Within white South Africa, where blacks were 
seen as inferior, and especially within the police, blame 
for the killings was attributed to "agitators" who had 
egged on the crowd and created a serious threat to the 
police. 
The second factor central to the backfire effect is 
availability of information to relevant audiences. News 
of the Sharpeville massacre was immediately available: 
many people had witnessed the events or had heard 
about them via reports by police and journalists, even 
though the police did make an effort to block 
information flow. 
The Sharpeville massacre is just one of many examples 
in which attacks on largely nonviolent protesters 
backfire. 
• The 1905 massacre of protesters in St Petersburg, 
Russia, triggered a massive increase in opposition to 
the Czar’s regime, including revolutionary action, first 
in the cities and eventually in the countryside.[4] 
• The beating of satyagrahis participating in the 1930 
salt march in India, led by Gandhi, weakened British 
popular support for colonial rule.[5] 
• The 1998 police shooting of protesting students at 
Trisaki University, Indonesia triggered a massive 
expansion in the opposition to President Suharto, who 
stepped down not long after.[6] 
Nonviolence scholar Gene Sharp called this process 
"political jiu-jitsu," in analogy with the sport of jiu-
jitsu in which the opponent’s strength and force are 
used against them. Examining hundreds of historical 
examples, Sharp found that political jiu-jitsu was such 
a predictable consequence of attack on nonviolent 
activists that he included it as a key stage in what he 
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called "the dynamics of nonviolent action."[7] 
This same sort of process also occurs in cases that do 
not fit the category of nonviolent action. In 1991, 
several Los Angeles police beat a fleeing black motorist 
named Rodney King, causing him serious injuries. This 
was not exceptional in itself; in preceding years, 
millions of dollars had been paid, as a result of 
judgements, jury verdicts or settlements, to claimants 
alleging police brutality by members of the Los Angeles 
Police Department. However, the beating of Rodney 
King was captured on video by George Holliday, one of 
many witnesses, and broadcast on television shortly 
after, causing outrage among many viewers.[8] 
Rodney King was not a nonviolent activist, so, strictly 
speaking, Sharp’s framework of political jiu-jitsu does 
not apply to the reaction to his beating. Clearly, 
though, the same sorts of dynamics are involved: 
outrage when evidence of what appears to be a gross 
injustice is available to concerned people. I use the 
term "backfire" here to include all such cases in which 
people react against what they perceive as an unjust 
attack. It can occur in a wide variety of contexts, for 
example in response to censorship[9] and torture.[10] 
A related concept is "blowback," a term used to 
describe unforeseen adverse consequences of 
government policies, especially covert operations.[11] 
More generally, policies can be assessed as 
counterproductive, according to some criteria.[12] 
These concepts diverge from "backfire," as used here, 
in that the centrepiece of the backfire process is an 
attack that can be perceived to be unjust. 
Many attackers realise, consciously or intuitively, that 
their attacks can backfire, and take measures to 
mitigate this effect. However, it is not necessary to 
know the motivations of attackers in order to analyse 
backfire dynamics; all that is required is observation of 
actions that do indeed have the potential to inhibit 
backfire. There are five principal ways to inhibit 
backfire. 
  
1. The attack is hidden, for example by secrecy, 
censorship and false reports, to minimise awareness of 
its existence or significance. 
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Immediately after the Sharpeville massacre, police 
cordoned off the township and prevented entry of 
journalists. They also covered up the use of "dum-
dum" bullets that expand on impact, causing extensive 
injuries. The uproar over the Rodney King beating was 
an anomaly because it was videotaped; police are less 
likely to engage in brutal beatings when independent 
witnesses are obviously present. 
  
2. The target is devalued, for example by destroying its 
reputation or even dehumanising it, to create the 
impression that the target deserves being attacked or 
that it doesn’t really matter. 
Under apartheid in South Africa, many whites did not 
consider blacks to have the same human rights as 
themselves. Rodney King was denigrated as a petty 
criminal and, in the months following his beating, was 
arrested several times in ways that harmed his 
reputation.[13] 
  
3. Events are reinterpreted, with the alternative 
interpretation being that an attack didn’t occur or no 
injustice was involved, for example that the victim was 
actually the aggressor. 
The South African police blamed the Sharpeville 
massacre on black "agitators." Critics of Rodney King 
said that he was a "felony evader" and a "monster" who 
was an immediate threat to the police who beat him. 
  
4. Official bodies undertake investigations or make 
pronouncements that legitimate the attack. 
After the Sharpeville massacre, a commission of 
inquiry was held and, through its assumptions and 
superficial investigation, minimised the implications of 
the events. Four police officers twice faced criminal 
charges in court over the Rodney King beating, a focus 
on individuals that diverted attention from wider 
problems with Los Angeles Police Department use-of-
force policies and practices. 
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5. The target, witnesses and supporters are intimidated 
so that concern about the attacks is less easily voiced. 
Following the Sharpeville massacre, South African 
police went through the township arresting and 
beating up activists and others. Also, they forcibly 
removed injured protesters from hospitals. Following 
the Rodney King beating, in the course of the trials of 
Los Angeles police, many potential witnesses refused 
to testify due to fear of reprisals. 
  
Having listed methods of inhibiting backfire, the next 
stage is to examine "counter-inhibitors," namely ways 
of promoting backfire. That is normally the aim of 
those who are opposed to the attacks. Counter-
inhibitors include exposing the attack, validating the 
victims, exposing double standards, avoiding reliance 
on official inquiries, and resisting and exposing 
intimidation. 
With this framework, it is possible to systematically 
analyse the attack on Iraq, noting how the attackers 
attempted to inhibit backfire and how opponents 
attempted to maximise it. There is such a wealth of 
material on the events that only a few of many possible 
examples can be presented here. 
   
Cover-up 
Some wars are carried out in secrecy or by use of proxy 
armies, limiting the prospect for backfire. For example, 
the US government financially supported the French 
military in Vietnam for years until its defeat in 1954, 
and subsequently supported the South Vietnamese 
government and military before, during and after 
direct participation by US troops. The low profile of 
this involvement is one key reason why, from the late 
1940s until the mid 1960s, opposition to US-
government-supported attacks in Vietnam was limited.
[14] 
However, there was no prospect of covering up the 
2003 attack on Iraq. Throughout 2002, long in 
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advance of the actual assault, the US government 
increasingly signalled its intention to conquer Iraq. 
This made the likelihood of backfire much greater, at 
least if people perceived the attack as unjust. 
Nevertheless, cover-ups played a significant role. It is 
often perceived that the attack on Iraq only began in 
March 2003, but actually attacks occurred throughout 
the period after the first Gulf war, in 1991, until 2003. 
This included bombings of Iraq that seldom attracted 
news coverage or protest. After the first Gulf war, the 
US and British governments unilaterally set up "no-
fly" zones - no flying for Iraqi aircraft - over parts of 
Iraq, though these had no legal status, and made 
thousands of overflights between 1991 and 2003, 
including regular bombings leading to many civilian 
casualties.[15] 
Some attacks on Iraq in the period 1991-2003 were 
undertaken covertly, but others were made openly, 
sometimes with fanfare such as the bombings 
beginning in December 1998. For these latter attacks, 
the description "cover-up" is not quite appropriate, but 
still captures some of the dynamics. By being a matter 
of routine and usually operating below the threshold of 
interest for news media and peace groups, the attacks 
largely escaped scrutiny and seldom triggered outrage. 
The very normality and banality of the attacks served 
as a sort of de facto cover-up. 
Such de facto cover-ups applied to many other matters 
involving Iraq. The US government’s support for 
Saddam Hussein’s regime throughout the 1980s was, 
following the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
seldom mentioned by US government officials, 
especially in the 2002-2003 lead-up to attack. Nor did 
officials mention the US government’s unwillingness to 
topple Saddam Hussein in 1991 when, just after the 
first Gulf War, it had the opportunity. This silence 
about earlier complicity with the regime became more 
salient as US officials castigated the Iraqi regime for 
having biological and chemical weapons and for using 
chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Kurdish 
civilians in the 1980s. Little was said by official sources 
about the role of US and British governments and 
companies in supplying materials for the Iraqi 
weapons programmes. For example, in President 
George W. Bush’s address to the nation of 17 March 
2003, on the eve of the attack on Iraq, he stated "This 
regime has already used weapons of mass destruction 
Page 7 of 24Iraq attack backfire
5/17/2006http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/04epw.html
against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people."[16] 
However, he did not mention that this occurred in the 
1980s when the US government supported the Iraqi 
regime, nor that the US government covered up the 
chemical weapons attack.[17] (Similarly, the British 
government covered up its role in building the 
chemical plant in Iraq used for production of chemical 
weapons.[18]) In his address, Bush did not mention 
that the US government in 2001 undermined 
international efforts to develop a biological weapons 
convention, nor that the US has the world’s largest 
biological weapons programme. 
The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq beginning in 1990 
resulted in enormous levels of suffering and death, 
with figures around a million extra deaths over a 
decade commonly being quoted, but with no apparent 
impact on the rule of Saddam Hussein. Such a death 
toll might have been treated, in other circumstances, 
as a emergency warranting humanitarian intervention; 
the process of de facto cover-up - namely, lack of 
attention or concern by government officials - turned 
this into an unremarkable occurrence or a "price that 
had to be paid."[19] 
The investigation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
was subject to more conventional cover-ups and 
disinformation, at least by some accounts.[20] The 
lack of evidence of effective, deliverable biological, 
chemical or nuclear weapons in Iraq was covered up by 
false and misleading claims, for example of Iraqi 
importation of uranium from Niger. US spying under 
the cover of the UN weapons inspectors was also 
covered up. 
Cover-up is greatly aided when mass media report US 
government pronouncements with no critical analysis 
or historical background, and do not run stories 
presenting other perspectives. This is typical of much 
western reporting, especially in the US.[21] 
The counter to these forms of cover-up is 
straightforward: exposure of information, for example 
of US government support for Saddam Hussein in the 
1980s. Some writers and activists made great efforts to 
expose the horrific consequences of the sanctions. 
Finally, as mentioned, the conquest of Iraq was 
undertaken openly and signalled well in advance. In 
these circumstances, cover-up did not work very well 
to inhibit backfire from the attack. 
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Devaluing the target 
The most obvious method of devaluing Iraq as a target 
was by demonising Saddam Hussein. There is no 
doubt that Saddam was a brutal and dangerous 
dictator, guilty of gross human rights violations and 
launching wars against Iran and Kuwait. Even so, US 
government officials painted Saddam as an even 
greater monster, for example by comparisons with 
Hitler. Bush in a talk in Prague on 20 November 2002 
said, "Czechs and Slovaks learned through the harsh 
experience of 1938, ... that aggression left unchecked 
by the great democracies can rob millions of their 
liberty and their lives." He went on to say, "A dictator 
who has used weapons of mass destruction on his own 
people must not be allowed to produce or possess 
those weapons. We will not permit Saddam Hussein to 
blackmail and/or terrorize nations which love 
freedom."[22] This was an implicit comparison 
between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, at least as 
interpreted by reporters.[23] Similarly, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, in an interview with The 
Guardian, drew parallels between confronting fascism 
in the 1930s and confronting Iraq.[24] 
The comparison with Hitler was misleading in more 
than one respect. Hitler was a far greater danger to the 
world because he commanded the extremely powerful 
German military machine and embarked on a 
programme of conquest; Saddam, though probably 
more brutal personally, commanded only the mediocre 
Iraqi military, with limited capacity for aggression 
after 1991. To compare Saddam with Hitler, as dangers 
to the world, was to confuse personal evil with state 
capacities. Many torturers and serial killers are just as 
evil personally as Saddam or Hitler, but they do not 
pose more than a local danger to the world. 
Opponents of the attack on Iraq did not try to argue 
that Saddam was virtuous. Instead, their response can 
be summarised by the questions "Why Iraq?" and 
"Why (attack) now?" They pointed to double 
standards: there are plenty of brutal dictators in the 
world, including some who rule countries allied in the 
"war on terrorism," such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan. 
Critics questioned why Iraq was singled out, among all 
the world’s repressive regimes, for attack. Double 
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standards were also involved in demonising Saddam, 
given that in the 1980s, when he had been just as 
ruthless, he had been an ally. 
The demonisation of Saddam no doubt helped 
convince some people to support the attack on Iraq. 
Others, though, used the double standard test to draw 
an opposite conclusion. 
  
Interpreting the attack 
The attack on Iraq was perceived by many as a case of 
the world’s sole superpower and possessor of 
overwhelming military force conquering a relatively 
weak country that posed no immediate threat. The 
attack was seen as unjust because it was illegal and 
because it was disproportionate to any threat posed by 
Iraq. 
To counter this perception, supporters of the attack 
offered a series of interpretations of what was going 
on. Whether these interpretations are considered to be 
honest views or as calculated public relations,[25] they 
operated to reduce backfire. 
For a long time, the main theme was that Iraqi 
militarism was a threat to the world, including to the 
US, especially via weapons of mass destruction. This 
cleverly reinterpreted the attackers as the targets, and 
the target, Iraq, as the attacker. The attack on Iraq 
then could be interpreted as a form of defence, an 
interpretation that was formalised as the doctrine of 
pre-emption.[26] 
The interpretation that the Iraqi regime was the 
(potential) attacker was pursued in various ways, 
including reference to Iraqi military use of chemical 
weapons in the 1980s, claims that evidence for Iraqi 
weapons programmes existed and claims that the UN 
weapons inspection process was not working. 
Underlying the ongoing claims by US and other 
officials was the assumption that the primary danger 
was from Iraq, indeed such an overwhelming and 
immediate danger that war was required and that any 
other course of action constituted appeasement. 
At one point, inspectors found that some Iraqi al-
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Samoud II missiles, in testing, travelled further than 
the 150-kilometre limit placed on them after the first 
Gulf war: in particular, that they could travel up to 183 
kilometres. Iraqi officials claimed that this was because 
the missiles had no payload. However, US and British 
officials made great play over this evidence of a threat - 
the missiles might be able to deliver biological or 
chemical weapons - and over Saddam’s alleged 
unwillingness to disarm, even though a 183-kilometre 
range was far short of what could reach Israel, much 
less the US. The key point here is that the focus was 
entirely on the Iraqi military threat. 
In the psychological process of projection, a person 
denies a certain undesirable part of their personality 
and instead attributes it to others, and then attacks 
them.[27] It could be said that US government 
officials, in planning an attack on Iraq, denied their 
own aggression and instead attributed it to the Iraqi 
regime, which was seen as so dangerous that it had to 
be attacked, and encouraged others to use the same 
process of projection. 
Language played a big role in attempts to justify the 
attack. During the Cold War, the expression "weapons 
of mass destruction" referred exclusively to nuclear 
weapons. In the lead up to the attack on Iraq, US 
government officials expanded the meaning to include 
biological and chemical weapons, even though there 
were no examples where biological or chemical 
weapons had ever caused or were likely to cause "mass 
destruction" approaching the scale routinely achieved 
using conventional weapons.[28] Other US-
government favoured expressions included "regime 
change" (rather than "government overthrow"), "death 
squads" (instead of "fedayeen"), "thugs" (instead of 
"troops") and "liberation" (instead of "conquest" or 
"occupation").[29] 
The second main argument used by the US 
government to justify the attack was that the Iraqi 
government was supplying weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorists, or was capable of doing so. 
Bush in his address to the nation just before the attack 
stated, "The regime … has aided, trained, and harbored 
terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda."[30] 
Carefully crafted statements gave the impression that 
Saddam Hussein was implicated in the September 11 
attacks - polls showed that many US citizens believed 
this was the case[31] - though no substantive evidence 
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was ever presented to show any link between al Qaeda 
and the Iraqi regime.[32] 
A third argument was that Iraq must be attacked to 
liberate Iraqis from Saddam Hussein. 
Although many people were persuaded by one or more 
of these interpretations of the attack, many others 
found them wanting. Critics presented evidence of the 
absence of any serious threat from Iraq, of the 
effectiveness of the UN weapons inspection process, of 
Osama bin Laden’s hostility to the secular Iraqi 
regime, and of fraudulent documents used to make the 
case against Saddam Hussein.[33] 
Critics also pointed to double standards. Iraq’s nuclear 
weapons programme was nonexistent or at least far 
from making a bomb; why was it seen as such an 
urgent threat when known weapons states, including 
Pakistan, Israel, China and indeed the US itself, were 
not subject to the same strictures?[34] Why was Iraq’s 
meagre potential to make deliverable chemical and 
biological weapons seen as such a threat when dozens 
of other countries had a greater capacity? 
As for the alleged need to liberate Iraqi, why not also 
undertake wars to liberate Pakistanis or Uzbekis, 
among others? 
Of the huge outpouring of words leading up to the 
attack on Iraq, a large proportion were about 
interpretation of what was going on. Those who 
supported an attack presented evidence and, just as 
importantly, made assumptions that framed attack as 
necessary, just, even emancipatory. Opponents of the 
attack countered these interpretations using evidence 
and exposure of double standards. They also presented 
alternative interpretations, including that the attack 
was about US access to Iraqi oil, about US power in the 
Middle East, about revenge, about US world hegemony 
or about diverting US public attention away from 
domestic economic problems and scandals. 
For many commentators, the case for the invasion 
involved so many transparent lies and contradictions 
that they found it hard to take seriously and so 
responded with humour, such as in the British 
Channel 4 television comedy "Between Iraq and a 
Hard Place" of January 2003 
(http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/special_reports/iraq_hard_place
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In a Doonesbury strip, an instructor of CIA trainees 
says, "We’re here to serve the President. When he asks 
us to jump, what does the C.I.A. reply?" Dismissing the 
answer "How high?" the instructor says "No. That’s 
Congress. We say, ‘Into which country?’" In July 2003, 
inserting "weapons of mass destruction" into the 
google.com search engine led to a fake error message 
saying, "These weapons of mass destruction cannot be 




When a court makes a ruling, many people presume 
that justice is being done. The same applies when some 
other official body, such as an auditor, an ombudsman 
or a commission of inquiry, makes a ruling. Official 
channels give a stamp of approval for decisions. In 
quite a few cases, though, official channels are actually 
quite biased. For example, wealthy individuals and 
corporations can hire expensive legal counsel and 
obtain better results in court than others. Yet despite 
known biases, many official channels give the 
appearance of dispensing justice. 
For these reasons, official channels can be remarkably 
effective tools for inhibiting backfires. In the aftermath 
of the Sharpeville massacre, the government moved 
immediately to set up an official inquiry, in part "to 
head off any sympathy demonstrations and protests 
that could reasonably be expected in the wake of public 
reaction."[35] Formal inquiries, once established, take 
time, so that passions, kindled after an outrageous 
event, cool. 
Setting up an inquiry carries risks. "While any 
commission of inquiry carried the risk of wholesale 
condemnation of the government and the whole 
apartheid system, such an exercise could also be 
turned to advantage by mobilising support for the 
ruling party."[36] The commission into the Sharpeville 
massacre needed to be compliant, from the 
government’s point of view, but not so compliant that 
it discredited itself in the eyes of observers. A total 
whitewash of the police could be just as damaging to 
the government as a stinging attack. 
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The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles 
Police Department, set up after the Rodney King 
beating, was quite critical of the department.[37] On 
the other hand, the initial court acquittal of the police 
officers who beat Rodney King led to tragedy: the 
decision lacked credibility among black community 
members who had seen the video of the beating, and a 
major riot ensued. President George Bush Sr 
immediately announced his support for a second 
criminal prosecution of the same officers, a stance that 
seemed a response to the backlash from the first trial’s 
verdict. 
After the Iraqi army invaded and occupied Kuwait in 
1990, the United Nations Security Council endorsed 
the use of force against the invaders. This gave 
credibility to the US-led assault in 1991. Although 
many people favoured other measures against Iraq, 
notably sanctions, the existence of a UN endorsement 
made a big difference in justifying the war. 
In 2002-2003, though, there was no immediate 
pretext for attacking Iraq: no hard evidence of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction, no immediate risk of an 
Iraqi military attack on the US, no illegal Iraqi invasion 
or occupation of neighbouring countries. An attack in 
these circumstances could backfire. Obtaining UN 
approval for an attack would greatly reduce this 
backfire. 
The US government decided in 2002 to seek a UN 
resolution permitting an attack. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt to reduce the backlash from 
unilaterally launching an illegal, unjust assault. If UN 
approval had been obtained, it would have made a big 
difference in many people’s minds. To be sure, some 
people supported military action even without UN 
approval and others opposed it under any 
circumstances, but opinion polls showed a substantial 
middle ground of people who supported an invasion 
with UN endorsement but opposed it otherwise. 
As noted, official channels may give only the 
appearance of fairness. The UN is very far from being a 
neutral, independent body, as many analyses reveal,
[38] and the UN Security Council is even less neutral 
and independent. The US government applied its 
formidable persuasive powers - primarily threats and 
bribes, along with tendentious evidence - in an attempt 
to obtain a resolution authorising attack, and British 
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prime minister Tony Blair added his eloquence.[39] 
Though there was some reporting of the arm-twisting 
tactics used by US officials to obtain a favourable UN 
resolution,[40] many people would have been unaware 
of these behind-the-scenes machinations. UN 
endorsement remained a potent tool for legitimating 
an invasion. 
However, unlike previous occasions in which the 
Security Council was more susceptible to pressure, this 
time most of the member governments did not 
acquiesce; the existence of massive popular opposition 
to war played a significant role in stiffening the resolve 
of government leaders. Thus, when the US-
government-led "coalition" launched its attack on Iraq 
without UN endorsement, it had even less legitimacy 
than if no approach to the UN had been made at all. 
The delicacy of the "politics of endorsement" is 
suggested by the US government’s hot-and-cold 
approach to seeking a vote at the Security Council. Not 
long before the attack was initiated, US officials said 
they would bring a resolution before the Council. But 
then, as it appeared that the vote would go against an 
attack, the resolution was not put forward.[41] For 
minimising public backlash, it is better to have no vote 
at all than a hostile vote. Even so, having sought UN 
endorsement for months, the failure to obtain it made 
the backfire effect even more powerful. 
Another example of the role of official channels is the 
UN team, headed by Hans Blix, sent to Iraq in 2002 to 
look for weapons of mass destruction. If the team had 
found damning evidence, it would have provided 
convenient legitimation for an attack. However, by 
failing to report substantial Iraqi violations of UN-
imposed conditions, Blix became an obstacle to US 
government plans. Blix himself later claimed that some 
US officials had tried to discredit the UN team - and 
him personally - implicitly recognising that his team’s 
work was valued by the US government only for its 
potential role in legitimating an attack.[42] 
  
Intimidation and bribery 
If an attack can backfire when it is perceived by 
significant audiences to be unjust, then the addition of 
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intimidation and bribery to the mix is unlikely to make 
the attack seem more just, given that these means are 
widely seen as illegitimate. Nevertheless, intimidation 
and bribery can be effective if carried out behind the 
scenes. Given that the cover-up is a key means of 
inhibiting backfire, covering up intimidation and 
bribery is a natural accompaniment. 
One possible target is the opponent. Many attacks are 
both preceded and followed by threats and sometimes 
by bribes for the target to keep quiet. As described 
earlier, Iraq came under repeated military attack over 
the years 1991-2003. 
Another target is commentators, who may be 
threatened or wooed. It is well known that journalists 
who write uncritically about US government policy can 
be rewarded with greater access to officials, whereas 
those who are too critical may be penalised by denial of 
access. Those journalists who venture into certain 
sensitive areas may suffer censorship and dismissal.
[43] NBC dismissed veteran journalist Peter Arnett for 
making a few comments during the conquest that, 
though innocuous enough in the eyes of many, were 
labelled as treacherous by high officials. His treatment 
was an object lesson for anyone who might stray from 
the mainstream. US military forces in Iraq appeared to 
attack a number of independent journalists, killing 
several.[44] 
Experts who do not toe the line can come under attack. 
US government officials exposed the cover of covert 
CIA operative Valerie Plame apparently as a reprisal 
against her husband Joe Wilson, who publicly 
challenged official claims that Niger supplied uranium 
to Iraq.[45] US troops in Iraq have been threatened 
with reprisals should they be openly critical of US 
government policy.[46] 
Yet another target is members of official bodies. The 
bribes and threats used to pressure members of the 
UN Security Council have already been mentioned. 
Intimidation and bribery are risky strategies: if 
revealed, they can discredit those who use them. 
Therefore, a central task for those who want to 
magnify the backfire effect is to expose the use of these 
unsavoury means. 
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Conclusion 
The 2003 conquest of Iraq generated enormous 
hostility around the world, a popular and political 
reaction that can be interpreted as an example of how 
attacks can backfire. Much of this hostility can be 
attributed to the attack being perceived as unjust and 
disproportionate to anything the Iraqi regime had 
done, or threatened to do, to the attackers. 
Various measures taken by attackers can inhibit this 
sort of backfire effect. Five key methods are covering 
up the attack, devaluing the target, reinterpreting 
events, using official channels and intimidating critics. 
In the case of the attack on Iraq, each of these methods 
was used, but without great success. The impending 
invasion was announced to the world, so cover-up 
played a limited role, though it was important in 
limiting awareness of the ongoing attacks from 1991. 
The demonisation of Saddam Hussein was perhaps the 
most effective tool in inhibiting backfire, convincing 
many people that attack was justified, but was 
powerfully countered by exposure of double standards 
such as via the queries "Why Iraq?" and "Why now?" 
Various arguments were advanced for attacking Iraq: 
to prevent Iraqi aggressive use of weapons of mass 
destruction, to prevent Iraqi government support for 
terrorists, and to liberate the Iraqi people. However, 
these arguments were not very effective, partly because 
of transparent inconsistencies and partly because of 
powerful counter-arguments. An attempt was made to 
legitimate the invasion by obtaining UN endorsement, 
but this failed, causing further delegitimation. Finally, 
there was some intimidation of critics of the attack, but 
this did not appear to significantly reduce the overall 
volume of criticism. 
The backfire framework helps to unify understanding 
of the ways that attacks are supported and opposed. To 
a casual consumer of the media, the lead-up to the 
invasion of Iraq could well have appeared bewildering, 
with multitudinous claims and counter-claims 
involving Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass 
destruction, disagreement between governments and 
so forth. The concept of backfire brings some order to 
this messy picture by focussing attention on the 
struggle over perceptions, specifically the perception of 
an attack as unjust or disproportionate. Attackers use 
various means that prevent or undermine such a 
perception, or in other words that inhibit backfire: 
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control of information (cover-up); rhetoric 
(devaluation of the target; reinterpretations); official 
channels; and exercise of economic and political power 
(intimidation). 
An analysis in terms of backfire sheds light on how to 
go about opposing unjust attacks. Basically, each of the 
methods used to inhibit backfire can be countered. 
Exposing cover-ups is crucially important and points 
to the vital role played by investigative journalists, 
whistleblowers, outspoken advocates, researchers and 
independent commentators. To expose cover-ups can 
be very difficult: persistence in both gathering and 
distributing information in a credible fashion is vital. 
Countering rhetorical means of justifying attack - 
devaluing the target and reinterpreting events - 
requires knowledge, commitment and eloquence. 
Commentary about an impending attack, or one that 
has already occurred, is far from irrelevant; instead, it 
is crucial in shaping attitudes that influence whether 
an attack proceeds or, if it does, how and whether 
future attacks occur. 
The role of official channels for legitimating attacks is 
the most challenging for opponents. There are two 
basic approaches to maximise backfire: to influence 
the official body to refuse to endorse the attack, or to 
undermine the credibility of the official body or its 
deliberations. The first approach is often more 
effective in the short term but, for official bodies whose 
appearance of fairness and neutrality is a facade, the 
second approach may be better. Finally, a good way to 
oppose intimidation is to expose it, thereby making it 
backfire. 
This analysis of backfire dynamics points to the crucial 
role of information and communication. Attacks 
backfire because of perceptions of injustice and 
disproportionality. Therefore, secrecy, disinformation, 
spin-doctoring and public relations may be of much 
greater importance for attackers than normally 
realised. This may apply in repressive regimes as well 
as in more open societies, as suggested by the role of 
secrecy and state propaganda in the Soviet Union and 
the secrecy in which the Nazis carried out their 
exterminations. The importance of official channels, 
even the most transparently fraudulent ones, for 
justifying injustice is suggested by Stalin’s show trials 
and the facade of elections in dictatorial regimes. 
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Backfire analysis can give a new appreciation of the 
diverse means of opposing attacks. Opposition to the 
attack on Iraq was most obvious in massive rallies 
throughout the world and in resistance by many 
governments to joining or endorsing an invasion. 
These forms of resistance cannot easily be separated 
from an ongoing struggle over information and 
meaning, involving news reports, articles, letters, 
leaflets, emails and everyday conversations. This 
struggle will continue long after the conquest of Iraq, 
for example in the ongoing debate over the presence or 
absence of weapons of mass destruction. 
In many cases, such as the Sharpeville massacre and 
the beating of Rodney King, backfire occurs after the 
attack. In the case of Iraq, in contrast, much of the 
backfire occurred before the attack. This suggests that 
an early warning system, raising concern about 
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